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WHY IS THIS FINANCIAL CRISIS 







A combination of cyclical and structural factors has lead to a situation which could 
threaten financial stability worldwide. As the current financial turmoil is unfolding it 
becomes clearer that the effects of the initial sub-prime crisis, which originated in the 
US, are spreading across other asset markets worldwide, increasing the likelihood of a 
global credit crunch and an economic downturn. In the light of these developments 
there is a need for the implementation of strategies for action. This paper focuses on 
structural causes of the current crisis and on policy issues such as enhancing 
transparency, resolving conflicts of interest, incentives structures in the financial 
industry and, not least, improving the existing regulatory and supervisory frameworks. 
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”While the Committee strongly believes that large, deep, liquid and innovative financial 
markets will result in substantial efficiency gains and will therefore bring individual 
benefits to European citizens, it also believes that greater efficiency does not 
necessarily go hand in hand with enhanced stability” (Alexandre Lamfalussy)
2. 
1. Introduction 
Increasing innovation in financial markets together with rapidly growing cross-border 
transactions (globalisation) aided by favourable low-interest rate conditions in 
                                                             
1 Background paper prepared for the ALDECON seminar on the international financial crisis, 27th 
February, 2008.  We thank for very helpful comments to Sharon Bowles, Wolf Klinz and Patrick 
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developed markets, against the background of inadequate regulatory frameworks, 
have created the premises for a potentially devastating financial crisis (more severe 
than the ongoing current crisis). It is too early to tell what the consequences of a full 
blown crisis would be as it is quite difficult to assess its impact on both the financial 
sector and the real economy; what is certain, however, is that this impact would be 
very damaging.  
The purpose of this policy paper is to have a look at the main causes that have 
triggered the current crisis and then review some of the suggestions to tackle it as 
highlighted by various market participants. From the start it looks as if at the roots of 
today’s unfolding crisis has been market participants’ behaviour of making reckless 
lending, often against no collateral, while regulatory and supervisory institutions were 
failing. But equally important it has been the very intense financial innovation of the 
past decade, which has allowed a wide dissemination of risks together with a blurring 
of the line delimiting who bears them. Without this wide dissemination the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis could, presumably, have been contained to a large extent, to the US 
markets. Ironically, what was thought to diminish risks at individual (micro) level has 
turned out to increase systemic risks; the latter have to be examined in conjunction 
with the expansion of global markets.  
It has to be said, however, that elements of the ongoing crisis make integral part of the 
long standing pattern of booms and busts in asset markets. Often, the mechanism 
through which these financial crises develop is, as mentioned by Michael Bordo 
(2007), the emergence of new financial instruments. The latter are often designed in 
such a way as to avoid regulation and necessarily require a test of financial stress in 
order to be proved successful or not. Initially, the euphoria of the boom, financed 
through credit, blurs the distinction between sound and less profitable prospects, a 
situation which could induce an asset price bubble. Information asymmetries 
compound the initial problem leading to moral hazard
 1 and adverse selection
2. The 
bust – often triggered by an increase in interest rates - brings an end to the lending 
cycle. In hindsight, recent crises, such as the LTCM or Enron could be considered as 
stress tests for the financial system. Although they were quite severe, their global 
effects could be contained in the end because, at that time, the financial markets’ 
degree of sophistication did not, arguably, reach the level and depth as witnessed 
nowadays. It seems that delays in the effective implementation and enforcement of 
changes in regulatory systems, as flagged out by these early warning signs
3, are at 
least partially, at the root cause for the turmoil we are witnessing nowadays.       
Financial crises are powerful events and can have very  serious implications. If the 
effects of the crisis affect the real economy, this could in turn trigger a fall in 
consumers’ wealth and consumption and it might take years until the economy settles 
                                                             
1 See Mishkin (1997). 
2 Moral hazard refers to a situation when market participants take excessive risks, if they believe 
someone will bail them out if things go wrong. Adverse selection occurs when buyers/traders 
are unable to differentiate between the quality of financial products, ie loans for instance.     
3 By making reference to the LTCM episode Krugman said, years ago: “The hedge fund scare 
revealed that modern financial markets, by creating many institutions that perform bank-like 
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back to the economic path at the point preceding the crisis. In effect, this is one of the 
main questions addressing the existing situation. Given the current state of short-term 
credit concerns in an economic environment where GDP has still been growing and 
house price declines have been rather modest, the question posed is what can be 
expected if the US enters a full-blown recession and average real estate values fall by 
a large amount. Spillover effects to other global asset markets would, undoubtedly, 
magnify the outcome of such a scenario.     
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section deals briefly with the issue of 
classification of financial crises, as documented in the literature. It also highlights 
similarities the current financial crisis has with more recent episodes of this kind. 
Section 3 describes what is particular of the current crisis. Finally, the last section 
summarises points of view expressed in the literature and the media about what can 
be done to avert the occurrence of such a crisis in the future.  
2. A Classification of Financial Crises 
 
2.1. What Causes Financial Crises? 
Financial crises are recurring phenomena which can have a significant impact on the 
economy. Depending on how one defines a financial crisis, there are various ways in 
which these can be classified. For instance, Anna J. Schwartz, a reputed US monetary 
economist, argued that a financial crisis should involve a run on the monetary base. 
Otherwise it would be difficult to distinguish between a pseudo-crisis and a real one. In 
practice, however, things are more difficult to assess once a crisis is unfolding. 
Financial crises could involve either bank or currency crises or indeed, both of them 
could take place at the same time. 
Historically, credit booms – that fuelled unsustainable rates of economic growth - 
seemed to have preceded financial crises. Delargy and Goodhart (1999) argue that 
both the late 19th century crises and those in the late 20th, were more likely when 
loose credit conditions in the lending countries were in place. Subsequently, when 
credit conditions suddenly adversely changed it generated a boom and bust economic 
cycle.  
The causes for financial crises are multiple and nowadays, a standard classification of 
currency crises revolves around one of the three generational models. 
The first generation models, pioneered by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber 
(1984) deal with crises that are mainly caused by macroeconomic vulnerabilities. In 
essence, at their origin is the government’s need to finance constantly higher deficits, 
eventually resorting to monetisation. Because these crises necessarily envisage a 
dynamic path for economic policies, they are therefore predictable. Classic examples 
are recent crises in Russia (1998) and Argentina (2001). Moreover, these type of 
crises could include a broader array of factors that trigger them, including monetary 
policy indiscipline, overvalued exchange rates and contagion from crises in relevant 
trading partners countries. Because of improved macroeconomic policies at the global 
level however, the frequency of these crises tend to be more rare nowadays.  Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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The second generation crises models focused on macroeconomic trade-offs and 
decisions. They emphasise non-financial conditions that may abruptly turn adverse in 
such a way that would present the authorities with a range of policy choices. As an 
example of the second generation crisis is the series of attacks on some European 
currencies within the European Monetary System in 1992-1993. Obstfeld (1986) has 
shown how crises can be self-fulfilling in such a situation. They also exhibit multiple 
equilibria and occur mainly because market participants expect them to materialise.  
The third generation crises address the balance sheet problems. A distinctive feature 
of those is that their causes reside in the financial sector vulnerabilities (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999). At the root of these vulnerabilities are mismatches between assets 
and liabilities, whether they are held by financial institutions or by the non-financial 
sector and irrespective whether they are a matter of concern for the public or private 
sectors. 
The frequency of this later strand of currency crises has become higher recently, as 
financial markets have become increasingly integrated. Different third-generation 
models explore various mechanisms through which balance-sheet exposures may lead 
to a currency and banking crisis. Thus, according to Mark et al (2002) there are four 
types of balance sheet mismatches that can be identified: 
•  maturity mismatches, where the gap between short term liabilities and liquid 
assets leaves an institution incapable to pledge its contractual commitments if 
lenders refuse to roll over debt or if creates exposure in the face of interest rate 
rising  
•  currency mismatches, where sudden changes in exchange rates lead to a 
capital loss; 
•  capital structure problems, where excessive leverage leaves a firm or bank 
exposed to uncertain revenue shocks in adverse market conditions 
•  solvency problems, in cases where assets are insufficient to cover liabilities. 
Solvency risk can arise from various reasons. For instance, Chang and Velasco 
(2001) show that a liquidity exposure leads to the possibility of a Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) style bank run. In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) firms face 
a liquidity problem because they finance risky long term projects with foreign 
loans but have access to limited amounts of internationally accepted collateral. 
It is within the third generation models that most recent financial crisis are part of. A 
characteristic of the latest financial sub-prime crisis is the collapse of short-term 
commercial paper market, thus impeding the attraction of new financing or rolling over 
existing short-term liabilities.  
There are quite a few episodes of financial crises in the economic history
1. Probably 
the earlier classic example of a financial bubble is that of the Dutch tulip mania of 
1634-1637
2. A single bulb of Semper Augustus traded from a few florins in 1634 and 
                                                             
1 See Appendix 1 for a succint description of the most recent financial crises and their economic 
consequences. 
2 Kindleberger (2000) offers an account of this episode as well as other renowed financial crises 
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rose to 6,390 florins in 1637, before collapsing to a tenth of a florin, at which price it 
traded for the next century.  
But there are more other famous examples like the Overend and Guerney (1866),   
Barings Bank (1890 and 1995) or The Great Depression (1929-1933). Subsequent to 
these crises, landmark changes in the regulatory and supervisory rules were 
introduced.  
2.2. Relevant History Lessons and Policy Implications 
•  After Overend and Guerney went bankrupt in 1866, Walter Bagehot advocated 
the ‘lender of last resort’ role for the Bank of England. Its main objective would 
be to avert a systemic crisis by providing liquidity to the financial system during 
crises. 
•  In the aftermath of the 1929 crisis, the so-called New Deal was introduced by the 
US President, Franklin Roosevelt. This included extensive regulation of financial 
markets and the banking system through the creation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). It also led to a separation of banking activities through the Glass-
Steagall Act. 
•  Subsequent to the Barings crisis in 1995, the Bank of England restructured its 
Supervision and Surveillance system. It implemented a new model (RATE) for 
assessing risk
1 while increasing cooperation with other central banks 
supervisory departments. Its changes were followed suit by other national 
Supervisory institutions (for instance Germany’s, which introduced minimum 
requirements for the trading activities of credit institutions). 
•  After the Black Monday crush of 1987, regulatory bodies introduced the so-
called ‘circuit-breakers’ aimed at limiting programme trading and allowing them 
to suspend all trades for short periods. 
•  The seriousness of the LTCM crisis in 1998 prompted the US President's 
Working Group on Financial Markets to issue a report on the hedge fund 
implications for systemic risk in financial markets
2. Its central policy 
recommendation was that regulators and supervisors should foster an 
environment in which market discipline constrains excessive leverage and risk-
taking. 
•  Investigations by SEC in the Enron scandal (2001) revealed major flaws in the 
existing regulatory and supervisory system. Among these were rating agencies’ 
conflict of interests, fraudulent management activities and the extensive leverage 
of the off-balance financial entities. 
Obviously, there are many similarities among this crisis and previous episodes. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), for instance, provide a historical comparison. They were 
preceded by periods of credit booms facilitated by low interest rate environments. 
Often the emergence of crises was facilitated by obsolete framework designs of 
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institutions which have a regulatory and supervisory role. But there is also a number of 
issues, such as the workability of securitised lending and the roles of central banks and 
regulators, which makes this crisis different (Wolf, 2007). 
Table 1 below provides a succinct explanation of the causes and consequences in 
recent crises. More about those is presented in Appendix 1.  
Table 1  
The Causes and Consequences of Recent Crises 
 Causes  Consequences 
The Enron Scandal, 
2001 
Conflicts of interest; complex 
structured finance transactions 
rolled via through off-books 
financial entities; fraudulent 
activities 
Systemic effects – on 
creditors, banks and other 
energy trading companies.  
The DotCom Crash, 
2000 
Limited investment  knowledge 
of individual market participants
Temporary closure of the 
financial markets; business 
investment falling and the US 
economy slowing 
LTCM crisis, 1998  High leverage factor; 
sophisticated computer models 
to assess investment strategies
Threatening systemic failure in 
international financial markets 
Asian Crisis 1997  Indiscriminate investments due 
to cheap credit availability and 
premature opening of the 
capital account 
Credit crunch and widespread 
bankruptcies; slower global 
growth 
The ‘Black Monday’ 
Crash of 1987. 
Programme trading strategies 
and market perception 
The US stockmarket suffered 
its largest one-day fall 
Latin American Debt 
Default of 1982 
Economic and financial 
liberalisation; Indiscriminate 
investments due to cheap 
credit availability 
Credit crunch and widespread 
bankruptcies; slower global 
growth 
S&L crisis 1980  Unsound real estate lending  Potential systemic risk 
The Penn Central 
crisis, 1970 
Unable to roll over short term 
debt  
Threat of the spill over into the 
banking system 
3. The Current Crisis – What Has Triggered It and 
Implications 
The first signs that signalled the emergence of the current financial crisis first surfaced 
in June 2007 when two hedge funds run by the investment bank Bear Stearns got into 
difficulty
1. The funds borrowed against collateral which was held by the lenders - 
                                                             
1 In March 2008, the precarious financial position of the Bear Stearns investment bank triggered 
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known as prime brokers. When one of the brokers tried to sell the collateral its actions 
succeeded only in driving prices sharply lower. More than eight months into the crisis it 
seems that it would continue well into 2008 and, possibly, 2009, and its effects could 
be felt  for years to come. 
Although the emerging markets do not seem to be affected so far substantially
1 it might 
be only a question of time before the crisis would spill over into their markets because 
of globalisation effects,  
The current financial crisis is so severe and manysided that its implications can hardly 
be underplayed. Policies and market structures (including supervision and regulatory 
frameworks) have to be re-examined and mended. This crisis prods us to return to 
tenets of pragmatism and open mindedness in policy making.  
3.1. The Roots of the Current Crisis 
The root causes of the current financial market turmoil are to be found at both macro 
and micro level
2. An analytical classification would identify structural and cyclical 
factors. 
Structural Factors: 
•  A dramatic rise in the role of capital markets (non-banking financial institutions) 
in the financial intermediation process. The growing complexity of financial 
markets has become an issue in itself.  
•  An increasing use of new financial instruments (securitisation) which have 
spread out risks across national borders, but which have made markets more 
opaque (reduced transparency). ). In part this was due to the lack of due 
diligence
3. However, the lack of effective trading of many of the new financial 
products has made rising opacity quite inevitable. 
•  Rising opacity of financial markets has accentuated systemic risks. There has 
been a fallacy of composition at play here. The ‘origination and distribution” of 
synthetic products was meant to diminish individual (micro) risks by their 
diversification and spreading. But micro-rationality clashes with macro-rationality 
when markets lose transparency. As thoughtfully highlighted by Lamfalussy 
(2000, 2008) there is here an apparent trade-off between expected higher 
efficiency of financial intermediation and the stability of the financial system; the 
latter is becoming more fragile! 
•  The pressure of globalisation and the rise in cross-border operations. 
Transactions costs have been reduced constantly over the last years and, as a 
consequence, large volume of transactions can be carried out in short amounts 
of time. Again, these evolutions may in fact, have enhanced a lack of due 
diligence. 
                                                             
1 There are of course, a few exceptions. Some of the emerging markets have experienced a 
depreciation of their currencies following a flight of money for safety.  
2 See, for instance Buiter (2007). 
3 As excellently pointed out by Sharon Bowles. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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•  Inadequate quantitative methods (risk and econometric models) to the extent 
they are meant to replicate the functioning of actual markets and decision-
making relies heavily on them.
1  
•  Seemingly intractable conflicts of interest among market participants. 
•  Inadequate incentive structures (compensation schemes) in the financial 
industry that have encouraged excessive risk-taking at the expense of prudence. 
•  An excess of saving in a number of countries – notably China – and the global 
redistribution of wealth and income towards commodities exporting countries. 
But, also, one would have to mention, in this regard, the unusual situation of the 
US economy as the wealthiest and most developed in the world: instead of 
showing high domestic savings, and relatedly, substantial net capital outflows 
(which befits wealthy economies) its savings ratio is stunningly low and it relies 
on foreign capital in order to finance its large current account deficit;  the US 
economy is overdriven by consumption. 
•  And most importantly, inadequate and obsolete worldwide regulatory frame-
works; regulatory and supervisory failures have compounded the magnitude of 
the debt and credit risk. 
•  An over-reliance on the self-regulatory virtues of markets. 
Cyclical Factors: 
•  Excessively low risk-free interest rates at all maturities in major economies (the 
US, Euro land and Japan)
2. For instance, Taylor (2007) shows that a higher 
federal rate path would have averted much of the housing boom in the US. A 
higher interest rate would have decreased the supply of funds to the mortgage 
market. The excess liquidity was reinforced by countries with large exports to the 
US, such as China or Asian countries, those who had their domestic currencies 
pegged to the US dollar or the oil and commodities exporting countries which 
wanted to limit their appreciation of domestic currency against the US dollar.  
•  An unreasonable low credit risk spread across all instruments. 
Structural factors create the general conditions favourable for potentially generating a 
crisis while cyclical factors are those which help triggering it. The history of financial 
crises shows in fact, that, with regard to cyclical factors, the current turmoil is no 
different from previous episodes. Thus, it is the gap between high returns on capital 
and the low cost of capital, with irresponsible lending, which sows the seeds for 
financial crises. For instance, Ferguson and Schularick (2007) argue that this gap has 
been widened over the last years due to the recent integration of Asian labour force 
into the world economy. This has increased global returns while the cost of capital was 
maintained at a low level – as measured by low real interest rates. This situation is no 
different from the Barings crisis (1890), Latin America debt default (1980) or the Asian 
crisis (1997) when low yield investment opportunities in developed economies made 
                                                             
1 “Also being questioned are the mathematically elegant economic forecasting models that once 
again have been unable to anticipate a financial crisis…”(Greenspan, 2008, pp.13). 
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capital from these countries to fly to economies where higher return on capital could 
have been earned. Eventually, indiscriminate lending led to defaults, bankruptcies and, 
finally, crises.  
3.2. Features of the current crisis 
One legitimate question to ask is what makes this crisis different. There is a 
combination of factors that have led to the current situation. Some of them are similar 
to the ones that caused previous recent financial crises – as mentioned in the earlier 
section. However, increased innovation in financial products and their growing 
complexity, together with the failure of regulatory and supervising institutions
1 to keep 
up with those innovations, appear to have created the conditions for this crisis to 
emerge. Without being exhaustive, below are several characteristics that distinguish 
the current crisis from previous ones.      
3.2.1 The ‘Shadow Banking System’ 
What seems to have been happening is the irrevocable transformation of the modern-
day banking system, as we knew it. Traditionally, the main source of credit was 
commercial banks which were attracting deposits and then made loans to companies 
or consumers. Banks, through their combination of assets (loans, secured or 
unsecured) and liabilities (deposits withdrawable at demand) were in effect borrowing 
short and lending long. Thus, they were vulnerable to bank loans by deposit holders. 
Implicitly, the credit risk was retained on their books. Because banks provided a public 
utility, they were deemed to be systemically important and, to protect them from bank 
runs, the government devised measures to protect them, the most common being 
deposit insurance.   
However, over the past 10-15 years, this financial market model has changed 
substantially. On the one hand, banks have increasingly started to sell their credit risk 
to other investment groups, either via direct loan sales or by repackaging loans into 
bonds
2. This process, known as securitisation
3, allows banks to divide up the resulting 
residential mortgage-backed securities and place them in instruments called 
collateralised debt obligations or CDOs. The latter are then sold to a wide range of 
investors, depending on their appetite for risk. For instance, one set of securities, 
known as an equity tranche, pays the highest returns but is the first to suffer if the 
underlying bonds default. Other securities offer a lower yield but a triple-A credit rating, 
because a lot of defaults would be needed to trigger losses. 
More generally, asset securitisation involves the sale of income generating from 
various financial assets (mortgages, car loans, leases) by a company or bank to a 
special purpose vehicle (SPV). SPVs are the broad category of vehicles that can 
qualify as off balance-sheet. They are used for a broad range of items, from term 
                                                             
1 As Sharon Bowles observed to us “ and understaffing of supervisory institutions has weakened 
further surveillance operations”. 
2 Mortgages were bundled into residential mortgage-backed securities or RMBSs. 
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securitisation issuance, conduit securitisation issuance, and other entities. Many of the 
SPVs, which could be a trust or a company, have financed the purchase of these 
assets by the issue of short-term commercial paper, secured by those assets. 
Structures such as Conduit Financing Vehicles (CFVs) or Structured Investment 
Vehicles (SIVs) disintermediate banks by enabling a range of long dated debt 
instruments to be financed by short-term debt. A SIV is a type of SPV, most commonly 
associated with having CDOs and other longer-termed assets. The main benefit of 
SIVs is that they exploit an arbitrage, using higher-rate assets funded by short-term, 
lower rate, liabilities. SIVs are often called “conduits” because they create a channel 
through which the long-term debt they invest in can be funded by short-term debt. 
Because SIVs conduct their operations through capital markets – being often offshore 
entities – they evade the capital adequacy regulations to which banks are subject to!!! 
Because of this, the resulting ‘shadow banking system’ – as it is often called
1 – is 
exempt, to a large extent, to regulation and supervision as undergone by the banking 
system. And, as recent experience has shown, activities that involve a high degree of 
risk could take place undetected, or indeed ignored, until adverse conditions 
materialise – much in the same vein as in the LTCM or Enron crises. Moreover, recent 
regulatory reforms have even allowed some banks to reduce the amount of capital that 
they need to hold against the danger that borrowers default
2. Moreover, recent 
regulatory reforms have allowed even banks to reduce the amount of capital that they 
need to hold against the danger that borrowers default. 
In this respect, the recently introduced Basel II capital framework has been aimed at 
improving Basel I, which was adopted nearly two decades ago. Basel II is intended to 
provide a more conceptually consistent and transparent framework for evaluating 
systemic risk in the banking system, particularly through credit cycles. It represents a 
capital framework consisting of three pillars. Pillar 1 seeks to enhance the way 
minimum regulatory capital is calculated while Pillar 2 provides a supervisory review 
and oversight of the institution’s overall capital adequacy. The first two pillars are 
reinforced by the Pillar 3, which deals with transparency requirements.  However, this 
approach is more focused on the microeconomic risk and less on the overall 
implications of systemic risks. A new approach towards including systemic risk in the 
design of regulatory institutions would be beneficial. This is, arguably, the crucial 
challenge in reassessing supervisory and regulatory frameworks. 
One of the effects of the ‘shadow banking system’ is the lengthening of intermediation. 
With more market players, it becomes increasingly difficult to assess the nature and 
magnitude of the risk involved or to locate those who bear the risk. Securitisation of 
mortgages has spread the financial risks around the economy in such a way that banks 
were no longer deemed likely to go bankrupt because of holding the bad loans they 
originated.  The repackaging of mortgages in complex collateralised debt 
obligations has made it difficult to identify who is holding what. As a 
consequence, this has led to fears of credit risk among banks when dealing in the 
                                                             
1 See Tett and Davis (2007). 
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interbank lending market, pushing up the spread between three-month interbank rates 
and the policy rate in the US, the UK as well as in the Euro-area
1. As a matter of fact, 
financial innovation of the less benign sort operates as an in-built destabilizer for the 
financial system (creating a Minsky effect
2) 
The unexpected losses incurred by assets backed by US sub-prime mortgages have 
highlighted the potential high costs investors face regarding the type of loans 
underlying the assets they acquire. As a result, at the moment, the markets in these 
instruments have become extremely illiquid. Vehicles financed by short-term 
commercial paper, namely the SPVs, find themselves unable to issue more debt. More 
and more banks – which created the SPVs in the first place, are forced to take these 
losses on their balance sheets.   
The current crisis resembles an old-fashioned bank run
3 – in what a sudden demand 
for liquidity can lead to a fire sale of assets that depresses their price, making 
otherwise solvent institutions insolvent
4. The difference is that it takes place outside the 
banking system, namely in the ‘shadow banking system’. But the economic principles 
of the current crisis are still the same, it is only the market actors that have changed. In 
the traditional ‘banking system crisis’ the institution was a bank, its long term assets 
were loans, and its short term liabilities were deposits. In the ‘shadow banking system 
crisis’ the institution could be either a bank or an investment fund whereas the assets 
could be mortgage-backed securities or their derivatives, and the short-term credit is 
commercial paper. 
3.2.2 The High Level of Concentration 
According to a report by Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF, 2007), concentration 
has been one of the main characteristics of the structured finance market. In Europe 
for instance, the structured finance market grew by an impressive 25% in 2005 
reaching Euro 450 bn. in 2006. Over 70% of these deals are structured by 12 banks 
and the three rating agencies, Fitch, Standard & Poor's and Moody's cover the whole 
market
5. The high level of concentration has also been identified as one of the main 
issues arising from changes in banking fundamentals in the Institute of International 
Finance report (2007). Nowadays, there are a few large firms which provide a large 
part of the volume and liquidity in specific markets. This aspect raises liquidity issues 
because of the way in which market players are interconnected. 
3.2.3 The Breadth of the Crisis and the Lack of Trust 
Another salient feature of the current crisis is its extensive breadth across a large 
spectrum of financial market products. Consumer confidence has already been 
affected beyond the home loan sector. The trend on losses on credit card and auto 
loans is going up. Moreover, mortgage-related losses have started to be felt outside 
the banking sector. For instance, widening credit spreads on senior tranches of 
structured instruments have resulted in marking to market losses on the value of 
                                                             
1 See Appendix 2. 
2 See Minsky (1986). 
3 See Krishna (2007). 
4 See Huberto and Todd (2007) for implications of the central bank’s strategy in such a scenario. 
5 With Standard & Poor's and Moody's covering around 80% of the market.  Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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insurance written on these products. This, in turn, triggered market concerns which 
increasingly have affected higher-rated products and assets other than credit (Fender 
and Hordahl, 2007).  
The latest concerns relate to the impact of the subprime crisis on the Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS) market. If the current trend of increased insolvency rates in the economy 
is maintained, the impact on the CDS market, which is worth a staggering US$ 45 
trillion, would be significant. Such a scenario could lead to contagion, an abrupt 
contraction in credit and a sharp downturn in both US
1 and, to a lesser extent, the 
eurozone economies.      
Higher uncertainty regarding the distribution and extent of losses has made investors 
to take a flight for quality, which, in turn, has led to an increased liquidity demand. 
Central banks have responded to this by injecting large amounts of liquidity in the 
money market.  
However, the pursuance of such a policy is unlikely to bring an end to the current crisis 
for two reasons. Firstly, this measure does not address the root of the problem, namely 
that of the underlying fear that banks’ balance sheets are in a precarious position. Until 
banks, hedge funds, private equity funds and the rest acknowledge their losses, 
confidence will not be restored in the money markets and trading of structured finance 
products will continue to be impaired. Unfortunately, lossess can be unduly magnified 
because of strong multiplier effects. At the moment, the existence of counterparty risk 
is prevailing in the money markets.  
Secondly, the liquidity does not reach the market participants which mostly need it – 
i.e. the ‘shadow banking system’. This happens because liquidity is offered by central 
banks mainly through their discounted window operations, where only the banks have 
access. Moreover, these banks seem to be reluctant to access the offered available 
credit due to the stigma associated with this action. At the moment this effect seems to 
be more predominant in the US that in the EU. A bank tapping into central bank’s credit 
lines could be perceived as being in trouble by the other banks. The latter could cease 
of being involved in interbank transactions with the ailing bank.    
3.2.4 Extensive Leverage on a Large Scale by Some Market Participants 
An issue often raised during current debates concerning the causes of today’s crisis 
refers to a certain class of investors and the incidence of their decisions on the 
financial markets. In recent years, highly leveraged vehicles, have been very active in 
foreign exchange transactions as globalisation spread and opportunities in more 
traditional markets became scarce due to reduced volatility and low returns. Carry 
trades, a preferred investment choice for hedge funds, for instance, seem to be an 
important driver of cross-border bank lending. This magnifies their exposure to 
exchange rate fluctuations. One of the reasons why hedge funds decisions could have 
a strong impact on financial markets – even with systemic consequences, because of 
the institutions which are counterparts to hedge fund transactions – is that they use a 
very high leverage, required to ensure a high return on investors’ capital. True, so far, 
systemic risk has not been proven in this scenario but if hedge fund activities grow at 
                                                             
1 See Pimco (2008).  Why Is This Financial Crisis Occurring? How to Respond to It? 
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the current rate it may well happen. In favourable times this strategy can multiply 
returns, but, if market prices move against the investment strategy, it also augments 
risk by the same measure. 
Although hedge fund’s capital under management is still modest relative to traditional 
investment vehicles
1, such as pension and mutual funds, because they are highly 
leveraged and their operations less transparent, their market impact can be 
significant
2. However, hedge fund capital under management has posted a remarkably 
strong growth in recent years with investor capital increasing by more than three times 
between 2002 and March 2007, to well over US$1.5 trillion.  
As history shows, a small amount of hedging
3 could drive asset prices down 
significantly. In other words, the amount of asset selling seems not enough to explain 
large drops in asset prices, which were observed for instance in  the 1929 or 1987 
crashes. One reason why this could happen is because of the determinants of market 
liquidity (see Gennotte and Leland, 1990) through asymmetries in investors’ 
information sets, which works as follows Hedging plans
4  create additional supply as 
asset prices fall. Thus, a relatively minor change in the investors’ information set could 
trigger lower asset prices, which, in turn, due to hedging, lead to an even higher 
excess supply and a further fall in asset prices. Moreover contagion is possible and the 
crisis could spread to foreign markets even in the absence of hedging programmes in 
these markets. The propagating mechanism is through the price signals. Foreign 
investors observe the drop in asset prices in the hedged market, but because they are 
unaware of the extent of hedging, revise downwards their expectations, leading to a 
global fall in asset prices.      
Gennotte and Leland’s (1990) conclusion is that successful policies which would 
minimise the chance of future crashes occurring involve a wider dissemination of 
knowledge about hedgers’ actions. The authors reckon that increasing market 
knowledge on the size and trading requirements of hedging programmes could lessen 
the impact of such trades by a factor greater than 100 and, thus, could radically reduce 
the likelihood of market crashes
5.   
3.2.5 Rating Agencies Deficiencies 
As in the Penn Central crisis back in the1970s, most of the companies selling short-
term commercial paper were able to do so because of the prime rating given to those 
securities by the international rating agencies such as S&Ps, Moody's, Fitch and 
others. In a number of cases, rating agencies rated investments without the ultimate 
                                                             
1 Hedge fund investor capital has grown from 0.2% of world’s GDP in 1990 to more than 3% of 
world’s GDP in 2006 (Becker and Clifton, 2006). 
2 Recently, a number of hedge funds have agreed to voluntary disclosure procedures. 
3 As a percent of total financial markets transactions. 
4 It is worth mentioning that often, hedging plans and insurance are compulsory for some market 
players.   
5 Although Tobias (2007) finds that in the current crisis, there is an unusual high correlation 
among hedge funds, attributable to low hedge fund volatility. He argues that the current hedge 
fund environment differs from that existent in 1998, during the LTCM crisis. Also Kambhu et al 
(2007) suggest that counterparty credit risk management remains the best line of defence 
against systemic risk. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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investors knowing exactly what was behind the bonds
1. In fact, as in the Enron’s case, 
every market player had an incentive to make the deal, regardless of the homebuyers' 
ability to repay the loan. The buyer hoped to make a fast profit while the real-estate 
agent and mortgage broker were taking the fees. The banks in turn, by selling rapidly 
the loan, alleviated much of the implied risk.  
One of the criticisms addressed to the rating agencies is the fact that they have been 
notoriously slow in spotting the signs of the crisis. This situation resembles once again 
that of Enron, were credit agencies failed to signal company’s huge exposure. Then, 
the regulatory institutions all over the world designed a voluntary code for the 
agencies. But this was mainly aimed at sorting out the conflicts of interest whereby 
agencies were being paid by the companies they rate. Moreover, the agencies have 
been criticised for giving upbeat assessments of investments which turned out to be 
linked to risky home loans in the US 
The failure of rating agencies to warn over the sub-prime crisis has already made both 
US and EU to take steps to bring in legislation in order to improve and monitor the 
performance of the agencies and make them legally responsible for their actions
2. 
Recently, the US Financial Services subcommittee on capital markets said that it would 
hold a hearing into the role of credit rating agencies in the structured finance market - 
including mortgage-backed securities.  
4. How to Respond to This Crisis 
Over the last years, there has been an increased interest on the issues concerning 
financial stability. However, in spite of the warning signals given by preceding crises, 
changes required to minimise the impact of future crisis have been slow to being 
implemented. Numerous recommendations have been made by various working 
groups, supervisory committees, etc. but decisive measures have, so far, been limited. 
The seriousness of the current crisis has pushed public policy and private initiatives to 
a new level. The Financial Stability Forum for instance, has released an updated report 
(FSF, 2007) on highly leveraged institutions in which the focus is on financial stability 
issues relating to the hedge funds. IMF (2007) published a comprehensive report 
analysing the causes and consequences of the current financial turmoil together with a 
list of suggested policy actions. In the UK, the Northern Rock episode is likely to lead to 
regulatory changes being implemented in order to avoid such events in the future
3, 
including credible deposit insurance arrangements and regulating the liquidity position 
of banks.   
One reason why the changes have been slow to implement is the prevailing belief, by 
some market actors, that markets would sort themselves out in the end. This may well 
be true, up to a point. After that, however, the risks posed to the real and financial 
                                                             
1 Often, they were not interested to find out this information. 
2 So far neither the US nor the EU have actually brought about legislation. The US has Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 - but that was before the crisis. We are thankful for this 
remark to Wolf Klinz. 
3 See Mervyn King (2007).   Why Is This Financial Crisis Occurring? How to Respond to It? 
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sectors of the world economy might threaten to become greater than the benefits of 
non-regulation
1. The practical difficulty is, however, in determining exactly where that 
point lies.  
Structured finance instruments are useful because they offer a higher dispersion of 
credit risk. But higher dispersion is not automatically a better one; recent events have 
cast doubts over the functioning of securitised lending, as it is in its current form. One 
problem is that adding structured instruments to a bank’s portfolio has proved that it 
can lead to unanticipated risk concentrations, which, given the existing state of market 
knowledge together with the current supervisory and regulatory framework, are difficult 
to be dealt with (Fender and Mitchell, 2005). Another problem relates to various 
aspects pertaining to rating agencies in structured finance operations (BIS, 2005).   
There are a number of proposed strategies for action that would lead to improved 
financial stability. Strengthening national supervisory and regulatory frameworks, 
improving transparency, regulatory and public disclosure and finally, adopting an 
international approach to exercising effective surveillance, regulation, and supervision 
of financial activity have been suggested quite a while ago
2. Two of the most important 
policy challenges ahead are those related to transparency and liquidity
3. But, arguably, 
the most arduous task is to combat the scope for higher systemic risks when financial 
innovation is very intense.  
The policy actions which are mentioned below are aimed at dealing mainly with the 
structural factors identified in the previous section. The roots of cyclical factors are an 
inherent part of the business cycles and, therefore, more difficult to be dealt with. 
Nevertheless, sorting out issues relating to the structural factors would greatly enhance 
the stability of the global financial system.  
4.1. Improving Transparency 
•  There are certain market players categories which have minimum disclosure 
requirements. Given the fact that their trading decisions have significant impact 
on the overall financial system, it would make sense to strengthen their 
disclosure requirements. For instance, hedge funds and private equity funds are 
only a few of the market players that have, at most, rudimentary reporting 
obligations. As mentioned earlier in the paper, increased transparency of highly 
leveraged institutions – such as the hedge funds – has the potential to reduce 
market volatility when market conditions become adverse. It could also lessen 
the impact of trades by a large factor, thus, lowering radically the likelihood of 
market crashes. Recently, a number of hedge funds seem to have agreed to 
make voluntary disclosures of parts of their activities. 
•  Identify the ‘needs’ of the ‘Shadow Banking System’. It has become clear with 
the current sub-prime crises that the regulators’ ability to monitor the financial 
                                                             
1 In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, Fisher (1998) suggested that mitigating the crisis would be a 
better option than non-intervention. Although his remarks actually referred to the IMF role, the 
principle is the same. 
2 Se for instance Schinasi (2005). 
3 See Dodge (2007). Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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system had been hampered by banks’ use of non-transparent off-balance sheet 
financing. Consequently, addressing this issue would necessarily involve finding 
the answer for the ‘needs’ to be addressed. Given the large exposure of the 
financial system to non-bank lenders another option could be to set some kind of 
‘buyer of last resort’ to stand behind the markets, much as central banks do for 
the banking system. With lending becoming so disintermediated, in many 
sectors this is done by investors and not banks. Then, a run on the markets 
through the evaporations of liquidity raises the question of who is going to step in 
and provide that liquidity. 
•  Finding out who bears the risk. Over the last two decades the pace of product 
innovation in financial markets has by far outstripped regulators and supervisors 
capacity to keep up. Therefore, new mechanisms that would address this gap 
might be necessary. Apart from not being able to set a price for those complex 
structured products, it is not known who bears the risk. Thus, being able to 
correctly evaluate the origin of the risk these products possess and who bears it, 
would be a step forward in aiding to a proper re-design of the regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks. Recently, the Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS), which monitors financial market functioning for the central bank 
governors of the G10 countries, has established a working group to explore the 
structured finance instruments Fender and Mitchell (2005) highlight some of the 
group’s principal findings pertaining to the complexity and riskiness of tranched 
products. An important result is that, in order to understand the risk properties of 
these products, the evaluation of the risks should be done according to their 
contractual structure – as allowed in Basel II. The particularities of transactions 
makes the mission of assessing the riskiness of tranched instruments even more 
difficult. 
•  Re-design of the risk assessment specification procedures. Quantitative models 
employed to model investment decisions and risk assessment in financial 
markets have, inherently, a built-in conceptual flaw. The main problem is that 
risk cannot be summarised in a few figures, entailing a more comprehensive 
description. 
•  Addressing the costs of failure. The bailout procedures by central banks or the 
IMF tend to be provided, in general, free of charge. Making the institutions who 
fail to pay for this would discipline their behaviour. One way to address this could 
be by imposing some sort of Tobin’s tax, the equivalent to a transaction cost 
aimed at deterring speculation. 
4.2. Resolving Conflicts of Interest Among Market Participants 
•  Credit rating agencies have, inherently, conflicts of interest. They act on behalf 
of investors but, often, they are being paid by the issuers. Being paid by those 
they rate, and not by the investors, the common view is that credit rating 
agencies are under pressure to give their clients a favourable rating. While some 
credit rating agencies openly acknowledge that they are dependant on investors’ 
fees to stay in business, others argue that this income accounts for a small 
percentage of their total revenue and deny such conflicts of interest.   Why Is This Financial Crisis Occurring? How to Respond to It? 
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•  Conflicts of interest between individual and company objectives. There have 
been several proved cases where individual managers engaged in fraudulent 
behavior for their own benefit. As a consequence, the punishment of fraudulent 
behaviour should be applied at both the institutional as well as individual level. 
There should be a set of rules which could tighten requirements for directors to 
be vigilant and also provide protection for those who bring improper behaviour to 
public attention. However, in the end, it is the integrity of directors and 
executives which would limit the emergence of such crisis in the future. The 
current credit crisis, LTCM, Enron all involved improper behaviour by individual 
decision-makers. Absent integrity and in a permissive environment, such 
individuals will find ways to conceal information or to engage in fraud. 
Introducing high punishment penalties for such improper behaviour could limit 
the scale of the problem. 
•  Perceived conflicts of interest in the current business model. For instance, a set 
of investors and the issuers have, in general, a clear interest to have a stable 
financial market and a wide range of high-rate graded assets. On the other 
hand, the investors who take short-positions and the secondary market 
participants might have a higher interest to see downgrades so that they could 
pocket the ensuing financial gains. Financial markets tend to benefit from such 
speculative activities (though not always). The problem emerges when such 
actions are blown out of proportions, increasing uncertainty and spreading 
individual risks in such a way that systemic risk goes up incommensurately. 
•  Increased coherence between short-term corporate governance objectives and 
long-term planning strategies. Often, managers’ incentives to achieve short-term 
performance indicators are not consistent with a company’s longer term 
expansion plans. Thus, increased pressure on companies’ management to 
deliver short-term results might not be beneficial in the longer run. 
Compensation schemes should be revised so that risk-taking be not rewarded at 
the expense of prudence.   
•  Increasing knowledge transfer to all market participants. Arguably, the poor 
knowledge of some of the market participants has a lot to do with the 
development of the current crisis. The shifting of the risk on to the shoulders of 
those least able to understand it 
1has been a common feature of the existing 
crisis. Plans aimed at raising the knowledge base of all market participants, so 
that they would be aware of the potential risk entailed by their actions should, at 
least, help create a market awareness that higher risk could, in extreme 
circumstances, mean virtually negative returns.   
4.3. Improving the Existing Regulatory and Supervisory Frameworks 
•  Collective regulation. The intrinsic workings of the current financial systems 
indicate that banking institutions can no longer be separated from the securities 
markets. If so, it follows that the best option is to create a regulatory framework 
that would regulate concerned institutions as a whole. The on-going credit 
                                                             
1 This has been predominantly a US phenomenon, but the crisis is still unfolding. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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squeeze has proved that risk is apportioned to whoever market participant could 
bear it, so that regulating institutions individually would fail to close the gaps in 
the existing regulatory framework. A first step in this direction seems to be taken 
by the UK, where the Chancellor of the Exchequer has proposed changes to the 
regulatory regime which would involve all three participating institutions, the so-
called tripartite system of HM Treasury, Bank of England and Financial Services 
Authority. 
•  Coordinating Supervision and Regulation Activities.  Currently there are an 
increasing numbers of financial institutions which operate across many different 
national jurisdictions. Supervision and regulation are often organised at the 
national level, although in several instances national models share a large 
number of similarities
1. However, coordination attempts among national 
jurisdictions are difficult to achieve due to the ongoing creation of new 
institutions and new instruments. The development of an efficient EU-wide 
supervision and regulation of financial institutions and markets should allow a 
reduction in the current number of arrangements to be concluded. In an article in 
the FT, Tommaso Schioppa (2007) argues for a supervisory structure for 
multinational financial institutions at the EU level. Moreover, international co-
ordination of supervisory and regulatory policy has to become of commanding 
interest. The integration of the global financial system means that counterparty 
and systemic risks ceased to be a national or regional concern.  
•  Markets for Structured Finance Products.  The sub-prime crises effects were 
compounded because there was no liquid market for the complex structured 
finance products issued by the banks. These products have tended to be 
frequently 'marked-to-model', with models whose intricate mathematical and 
computational features have been quite often beyond the grasp of institution’s 
risk managers. Other alternative pricing methods, such as those used by credit 
agencies, proved to be flawed due to conflicting interests between the designers 
and the issuers of the instrument
2. One alternative to sort this out, as suggested 
by Buiter and Sibert (2007)
3, is through the creation of a market-maker of last 
resort. This institution would ‘create’ market prices for illiquid assets by 
purchases and sales of private sector securities and through the acceptance of a 
                                                             
1 Coordination among Central Banks in the EU seems to have already been working in a close 
and efficient manner and the challenge lies in the cooperation of supervisory authorities. 
Supervisory convergence has improved through the Lamfalussy process and the Level 3 
Committees. However, coordination attempts among national jurisdictions are yet difficult to 
achieve. Supervisory cooperation and convergence in the EU is lagging behind as the 
possibilities of the current framework are not fully realised. We are thankful for this comment to 
Wolf Klinz. Furthermore, the EU and the G7 operate with different mandates. Some 
convergence of objectives and means of action has to be achieved in this respect. 
2 Arguably, the rating quality during the subprime crisis has been questionable due to 
methodological aspects. Some argue that the conflict of interest seems to be a minor issue 
because of reputational aspects. Moreover, the credit rating agencies were only modeling 
credit default risk, not market liquidity risk. 
3 See Buiter and Sibert (2007).  Why Is This Financial Crisis Occurring? How to Respond to It? 
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comprehensive range of private sector securities as collateral in repos. This 
could be done through the central bank but another institution could be as easily 
set up which would have the necessary reputation and credibility to perform 
those operations. Practical considerations, however, would make this suggestion 
difficult to implement.           
•  Steps to integrate banks’ balance sheets. Some lessons from Japan’s 1989 
property bubble bear striking similarities with the sub-prime crisis. As highlighted 
in an article in The Economist
1, one reason both crises were not detected earlier 
was because most of the warning signs were not at parent banks but down the 
intermediation chain, namely in affiliates, subsidiaries or other off-balance sheet 
vehicles. Pre-crisis condition shared similarities in that in both cases financial 
engineering made available easy credit which sparked a property-related 
bubble, commercial in Japan and residential in the US. Integrated balance 
sheets reflecting the whole picture of banks' lending would have aided in the 
identifications of the problems much sooner and would have allowed a timely 
intervention by the regulatory and supervisory institutions. Thus, measures to 
report integrated bank balance sheets could be taken to diminish the intensity of 
future crisis
2. 
•  Deposit insurance versus Moral Hazard. As shown by Keely (1990) deposit 
insurance worked well prior to 1980’s However, increased competition within the 
banking and financial service industry has led to a moral hazard problem, in fact 
rewarding banks who took an excessive risk taking. Thus, these commercial 
banks were provided in fact with a ‘put’ in which the central bank was expected 
to bail them out in case they went into trouble. Banks could, in effect, borrow at 
the risk free rate through the issuance of insured deposits and then invest the 
proceeds in risky assets. This problem appeared to have been compounded in 
the early 1980’s when, increased competition in financial services industry 
caused banks charter values to decline (Keely, 1990). Thus, bank charter 
values, which previously were a high entry barrier in the industry, appear to have 
lost some ground in the face of demand for higher returns triggered by increased 
competition in the banking industry. One set of proposals is to give to some 
national authority enough powers to intervene in banking crises. Such models 
draws heavily on elements of the US, Canadian and Belgian where emergency 
roles are given to new institutions, such as Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation in the US, for instance. While this special insolvency regime for 
banks would allow a badly bank run to fail with diminished effects in triggering a 
systemic crisis caused by a loss of public confidence, this also compounds the 
moral hazard problem, and, as recent events in the US have shown, is of limited 
use when crisis spreads in other markets. 
                                                             
1 The Economist, ‘Lessons from Japan's financial crisis should worry, and embarrass, America’, 
13 December 2007. 
2 Basel II provides, indeed, a framework for this. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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•  Raising the capital requirements of the structured finance investment vehicles. 
This would reduce the liquidity risk – a major factor of concern in the current 
crisis. Again, these aspects are already covered under Basel II. But the 
challenge would be to enforce these rules and avoid loopholes to be exploited. 
Moreover, under Basel II banks were left with the impression that they have too 
much equity, thus encouraging excessive risk taking from their part. 
•  Enforcement of conformity and compliance systems. This is yet to be seen how 
would be resolved under the Basel II framework. It is true that, at the time when 
the crisis started, Basel II was half in half out. However, following recent 
developments, it becomes clearer that Basel II would need to be revised. The 
current crisis is different from the previous ones in what its spreading occurs in 
spite of the existing framework of accountancy and Basel II regulations. 
Therefore, it tends to suggest that these are inadequate to deal with the severity 
of the crisis. One drawback of the Basel II framework, for instance, is that it fails 
to incorporate systemic risks into the design of regulatory institutions and risk 
management (apparently, it relies too much on the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis
1). These aspects would need to be addressed.  
•  Risk management procedures and mechanisms in banks have to improve 
considerably. 
•  Use of counter-cyclical control mechanisms or instruments. Some authors argue 
that bank capital requirements should not only be contra-cyclical but also related 
to the rate of change of bank lending and asset prices in the relevant sectors
2. 
This is because risk models employed today undermine the assumptions that 
should make them work. They systematically underestimate risk in ‘good’ times 
and overestimate risk in ‘bad’ times. 
•  The timing of introducing new changes in the regulatory and supervisory 
systems is particularly important. Rushing radical changes overnight in these 
systems might actually exacerbate the crisis by worsening the credit crunch. 
Caution, is therefore, needed in the design and implementation phases of 
changing the regulatory and supervisory systems. At the same time, however, 
complacency and too slow change are not warranted. The flaws and creaks in 
the current supervisory and regulatory frameworks are quite visible and demand 
firm action.  
•  Cooperation between public and private institutions. This needs to be enhanced 
and re-designed to account for recent developments in the financial market 
innovations.     
                                                             
1 This hypothesis is linked with the rational expectations theory. 
2 See for instance Charles Goodhart and Avinash Persaud “A proposal for how to avoid the next 
crash”, Financial Times, 31 January 2008.  Why Is This Financial Crisis Occurring? How to Respond to It? 
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5. Summing up 
As the current crisis unfolds and the time passes by, it becomes clearer that we are 
being confronted with an event whose implications are bound to be long lasting. 
Addressing the roots of the problem that have triggered this crisis in the first place 
should be of paramount importance. Otherwise, threats caused to the global financial 
system as a whole as well as the global real economy would be incommensurate.  
In the past, such crises tended to be more localised and were dealt with more easily. 
The difference this time has been in the rapid spread of intense financial innovation 
which has occurred during the last couple of decades; this allowed dissemination of 
risks on a large scale at the expense of transparency. As a consequence, the 
emergence of the shadow banking system, largely unregulated and lacking appropriate 
supervision has brought about more opacity in financial markets transactions. In 
contrast to past crises, the excessive trust in the 'self-healing' power of markets has 
not yielded the expected result so far. 
It follows from here that one line of action should, necessary, be the regulation of the 
shadow banking system. The intrinsic workings of the current financial system indicate 
that banking institutions can no longer be separated from the securities markets. Thus, 
one feasible option would be the creation of a regulatory framework that would regulate 
concerned institutions as a whole.       
Securitisation of mortgages has spread the financial risks around the economy in such 
a way that banks' exposure to their bad loans has been minimal. But, the repackaging 
of mortgages in complex collateralised debt obligations has made it difficult to identify 
who is holding what. Ironically, financial innovation that was designed to diminish risk 
at the individual or micro level has ended up in exacerbating it at the macro level, thus 
increasing systemic risk. Two of the most important policy challenges ahead are those 
related to transparency and liquidity. But, arguably, the most arduous task is to combat 
the scope for higher systemic risks when financial innovation is very intense.       
In these cases traditional ways of risk assessment become obsolete. The complexity of 
todays' financial market instruments render risk assessment models unreliable. Thus, 
quantitative models employed to model investment decisions and risk assessment in 
financial markets have, inherently, a built-in conceptual flaw. One of the problems is 
that risk cannot be encapsulated in a few figures, asking for a more comprehensive 
description. There is a scope for a re-design of the risk assessment specification 
procedures. 
Another line of action should address the costs of failure. The bailout procedures by  
central banks or the IMF tend to be provided, in general, free of charge. Making the  
institutions which fail to pay for this would discipline their behaviour. One way to tackle 
this could be by the introduction of various measures aimed at deterring speculation. 
An issue closely related to this is managers' performance compensation packages. 
Often, managers' incentives to achieve short-term performance indicators are not 
consistent with a company's longer term expansion plans. Thus, increased pressure on 
companies' management to deliver short-term results might not be beneficial in the 
longer run. Compensation schemes should be revised so that risk-taking be not 
rewarded at the expense of prudence.  Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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Although Basel II regulatory framework has been devised to prevent such events 
occurring, the current crisis has highlighted the existing flaws in its design. Regulatory 
measures aimed at dealing with liquidity and system risk ought to be revised. 
Moreover, the use of counter-cyclical control mechanisms or instruments should be 
seriously considered. Capital requirements should not only be contra-cyclical but also 
related to the rate of change of bank lending and asset prices in the relevant sectors. 
Last but not least increasing coordination among national supervision and regulatory 
bodies should be enhanced. Global financial markets require a global approach in 
dealing with such issues. This cooperation is simply required in order to limit the 
potential devastating effects such crisis could have in the future on both the financial 
system and the real economy. Inside the EU this coordination is a must and Padoa 
Schioppa’s proposals should be given a more sympathetic hearing. 
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Appendix 1 
The recurrence of financial crises in economic history 
The Enron Scandal, 2001 
Enron, an American energy company, boasted revenues of more than US $110 bn in 
2000 and was named by Fortune ‘America's Most Innovative Company’ for six 
consecutive years. By November 2001, Enron was undergoing the largest bankruptcy 
in history. There are many causes of the Enron collapse, most of which could be found 
at the root of today’s sub-prime crisis. Firstly, there was the conflict of interest between 
the two roles played by Arthur Andersen, as auditor but also as consultant to Enron
1. 
Secondly, the company presented false and misleading pictures of its financial health 
and results of operations. Most of these operations were complex structured finance 
transactions rolled via through  off-books financial entities such as special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs). Thirdly, the objective of these fraudulent activities was twofold: to 
convince analysts and credit rating agencies that its reported earnings were real and to 
achieve its stated profit target which would allow company’s employees to receive their 
bonuses. In some ways, the culture of Enron was in itself the primary cause of the 
collapse. This seems to become more apparent today when not a few companies are, 
sometimes, involved in a similar type of activities.  
The DotCom Crash, 2000  
The public’s increasing interest in the internet-based companies had pushed up their 
share prices at a very fast rate. People, having no prior knowledge of stock trading, 
bought technology shares based on expectations of higher returns generated by future 
profits. But in March 2000, the bubble burst, and the technology-weighted Nasdaq 
index fell by 78% by October 2002. The crash had wide repercussions, with business 
investment falling and the US economy slowing in the following year, a process 
exacerbated later by the 9/11 attacks. Subsequently, these events led to a temporary 
closure of the financial markets. The response of the Federal Reserve was to gradually 
lower interest rates throughout 2001, from 6.25% to 1%, in order to stimulate economic 
growth.  
The collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management Fund (LTCM) in 1998 
Four years after its inception, the LTCM hedge fund collapsed, precipitating the first in-
depth analysis by policymakers of the potential systemic risks posed by the hedge fund 
industry. Although LTCM had, at the beginning of 1998, a leverage factor of thirty to 
one
2, LTCM's partners believed, on the basis of their complex computer models, that 
the long and short positions were highly correlated thus, yielding a small net risk. While 
the LTCM problems started to emerge when Russia defaulted on its government 
obligations, its collapse was precipitated by the ‘flight to liquidity’ across global fixed-
income markets, when investors started to shift their assets into more liquid assets. As 
a consequence LTCM’s short positions were priced higher relative to its long positions 
causing the hedge fund to collapse. However, the LTCM crisis proved to be much 
                                                             
1 See ‘SEC Settles Enforcement Proceedings against J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup’, Press 
Release, 2003-87, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-87.htm.  
2 In early 1998 LTCM had equity of $5 billion and had borrowed over $125 billion. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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deeper, threatening to pose a systemic risk to the financial system. This happened 
because other large hedge fund managers followed similar strategies as suggested by 
sophisticated computer models
1. Other reason was the similarity of positions held by a 
number of market participants, like investment banks.     
After the fund had lost substantial amounts of the investors' equity capital, in order to 
avoid the threat of a systemic crisis in the world financial system, the Federal Reserve 
co-ordinated a US $3.5 billion rescue package from leading U.S. investment and 
commercial banks. 
The seriousness of the crisis prompted the US President's Working Group on Financial 
Markets to issue a report on the hedge fund implications for systemic risk in financial 
markets
2. As Ben Bernanke put it, ‘The Working Group's central policy 
recommendation was that regulators and supervisors should foster an environment in 
which market discipline--in particular, counterparty risk management--constrains 
excessive leverage and risk-taking. Effective market discipline requires that 
counterparties and creditors obtain sufficient information to reliably assess clients' risk 
profiles and that they have systems to monitor and limit exposures to levels 
commensurate with each client's riskiness and creditworthiness’
3.  
Although those recommendations seemed to have common economic sense, they 
have failed to be comprehensively applied. Much of the on-going subprime crises 
stems from excessive leverage and risk-taking by market participants against the 
background of reckless use of new financial instruments.  
Asian Crisis 1997 
This was caused by large private capital flows to emerging markets in the search of 
higher yields. The resulting large quantities of credit that became available in Asian 
countries ignored risks and induced a highly-leveraged economic climate which 
pushed up asset prices at an unsustainable level. Subsequently, asset prices 
collapsed, generating large credit withdrawals from the crisis countries which caused a 
credit crunch and widespread bankruptcies. 
The ‘Black Monday’ Crash of 1987 
The US stockmarket suffered its largest one-day fall, dropping by more than 22% with 
European and Japanese markets following suit. The crisis was sparked by market 
participants’ conviction that insider trading and company takeovers on borrowed 
money were dominating the markets. Programme trading strategies for selling stocks 
indiscriminately, as markets fell, also exacerbating the decline. In order to prevent 
major commercial banks to fail, the central banks cut interest rates aggressively. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, regulatory bodies introduced the so-called ‘circuit-breakers’ 
aimed at limiting programme trading and allowing them to suspend all trades for short 
periods.   
                                                             
1 Garleanu and Pedersen (2007) suggest that there may has been a multiplier at work. 
2 Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management (1999). 
3 Ben S. Bernanke – ‘Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk’ Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, Georgia May 16, 2006.
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Latin American Debt Default of 1982 
During the mid 1970s many nations in Latin America, including Chile, Mexico, and 
Argentina introduced substantial economic reforms, involving the liberalisation of 
foreign trade, domestic financial markets, and privatisation of public industries. 
Exchange and capital controls together with other economic barriers were loosen 
without any increase in regulatory oversight.  
As a result of financial reforms foreign capital became easily available to domestic 
banks. The borrowing frenzy led Latin America to quadruple its external debt from US 
$75 billion in 1975 to more than US $314 billion in 1983, equivalent to 50% of the 
region’s gross domestic product (GDP). As interest rates increased in the US and 
Europe in 1979, Latin America countries found more difficult to finance their interest 
payments. As most foreign banks refused to roll over Latin America debt – most of 
which was short-term – many banks became close to being insolvent until a massive 
rescue was engineered between the Federal Reserve and the IMF. In this case the 
traditional banking crisis was compounded by the effects of the subsequent currency 
crisis. As in the S&L case (see below) irresponsible lending was the prime cause for 
the crisis.   
The Savings and Loan (S&L) Crisis of the 1980s  
This represented the failure of the savings and loan association in the US when, over 
1,000 savings and loan institutions ended up with a position of net equity. However, 
this did not prevent them from being able to borrow large sums at favourable rates, 
thanks to deposit insurance. That recklessness in lending was a factor aggravating 
both the boom and the subsequent bust of the S&L crisis. As in the current subprime 
crisis, the banking problems of the 1980s came primarily – although not exclusively - 
from unsound real estate lending. The final cost of resolving failed S&Ls was estimated 
at over $160 billion, with much of this cost being paid with taxpayers money
1. Probably 
the most important lessons to be taken from this crisis are those pertaining to 
regulatory issues. The S&L crisis highlighted the need for strong and effective 
supervision of insured depository institutions. Moreover, it showed that sorting out 
ailing financial institutions requires that the deposit insurance fund be strongly 
capitalised with real reserves, not just governmental guarantees. 
The Penn Central crisis, 1970 
The Penn Central Transportation Company was, at that time, the largest nonfinancial 
company in the United States to go bankrupt. It had massive amounts of short-term 
commercial paper outstanding
2 when the interest on its loans became an unbearable 
financial burden. The ensuing collapse of the railroad company led to a panic in the 
commercial paper market. Although an attempt was made by the government to save 
the company by guaranteeing its loans, it failed.  This episode has striking similarities 
with the subprime crisis. The creditworthiness of the rating agency ensured the 
issuance of large amounts of commercial paper which, subsequently, could not be 
rolled over. Then, as today, the Federal Reserve opened the discount window, fearing 
that the crisis would spill over into the banking system.  
                                                             
1 The roots of the early 1990’s recession can be traced to the S&L crisis.  
2 Commercial paper was rated as ‘prime’ by Dunn & Bradstreet. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
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The Great Depression (1929) 
The Great Depression triggered by the 1929 crash is another benchmark episode in 
the history of financial crashes. At that time, the bull market prevailing prior to the crash 
seemed to be fully justified. The post war economic boom spurred by new technologies 
were promising large increases in sales and corporate profits. The stockmarket fall was 
massive, by the time it reached bottom in 1932, 90% had been wiped off the value of 
shares
1. The effects on the economy were severe, by 1932 the US economy had 
declined by half, and one-third of the workforce was unemployed
2. In March 1933 the 
US President, Franklin Roosevelt took office and launched the New Deal, which 
addressed landmark changes in regulatory and supervisory rules.  
Barings crises (1890 and 1995) 
In 1980, llosses by a leading UK bank, Barings, made on its investments in Argentina 
forced a massive sale of securities in the United States. These were mainly triggered 
by the liquidity problems of British banks. In England, the Bank of England acted in its 
‘lender of last resort’ role and intervened in financial markets in order to prevent a 
systemic collapse of the UK banking.  
More than a century later, the same bank went bankrupt due to an explosive 
combination of financial and organisational shortcomings. Fraudulent activities of the 
bank’s management were facilitated by weak internal and external controls. Important 
supervisory and supervision rules were introduced by central banks in the aftermath of 
the 1995 Barings crisis.  
Overend and Guerney 1866 
Overend and Guerney was a discount bank which was supplying cash to London’s  
commercial and retail banks
3. A large number of these were left without access to 
funds when Overend and Guerney went bankrupt in 1866. It was then when Walter 
Bagehot advocated a new role for the Bank of England, namely the "lender of last 
resort". Its objective would be to avert a systemic crisis by providing liquidity to the 
financial system during crises. 
                                                             
1 It took 25 years before the Dow Jones industrial average recovered to its 1929 level. 
2 But the effects of the US stockmarket crush were felt strongly throughout the world. Economic 
hardship generated by this crisis was in fact sowing the seeds for the World Word II. 
3 At that time London was the world’s financial center.  Why Is This Financial Crisis Occurring? How to Respond to It? 
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Appendix 2 
Three-Month Interbank Spread Rates Over The Base Rate 
 
Difference between 3-month interbank rates and base rate 
 
BofE – Bank of England 
ECB – European Central Bank 
US – The US Federal Reserve 
 